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Article

The Federalization of BankingDue-On-Sales, A Case in Point

JOELLEN MITCHELL-LOCKYER*

The delivery of financial services has been revolutionized in this
generation by economic, technological, and demographic changes putting steady and effective pressure on the legal structure that shores
up the dual state and federal system of banking.' Over time, these
* Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; A.B.
Stanford University, 1972; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles, 1975. I wish most
particularly to thank California State Senator Barry Keene (Democrat) and his staff for
providing me with so much useful information about the-creation, development, and final transformation of Senate Bill 494. See S.B. 494, Cal. Leg., 1983-84 Regular Session. I wish also to
thank my research assistants, Mr. Allen Berry and Ms. Lorrie Yost for their help and support.
This Article is the companion piece to the author's treatment of Fidelity FederalSavings
and Loan Association v. Reginald de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. 3014, (1982, [hereinafter referred
to as "de la Cuesta"] appearing in 14 PAc. L.J. 1 (1982). In de la Cuesta the United States
Supreme Court held that a 1976 regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board [hereinafter
referred to as the FHLBB] had preempted California state policy prohibiting lender acceleration of real property loan obligations on transfer (the so called "due-on-sale" controversy),
at least insofar as lenders with a federal aspect were involved. See Mitchell-Lockyer, De la
Cuesta; Federal Determination of Contract and Property Rights?, 14 PAC. L.J. 1 (1982).
1. See generally, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Feb. 17, 1982, at 22, col.
1; Feb. 22, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Mar. 4, 1982, at 24, col. 1; Mar.
9, 1982, at 24, col. I (a multi-part treatment analyzing banking deregulation); HousE Comms.

ON BANKINO, FINANCE AND URBAN AntArs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Comm. Print 1981); THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANiING AND
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forces have created a system of financial practices and institutions
that is truly national in character, notwithstanding its form de jure.
The history of banking in America demonstrates the hostility of citizens

to the concentrated political power that a centralized federal strucSEcurIms INDUsTRES (L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979); Mutual Fund Assets Soared in

1981, Powered by Money Market Funds, (Jan.-June) WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) no. 1, at A-13
to -14 (Jan. 4, 1982).
See Daniel, Longbrake & Murphy, The Effect of Technology on Bank Economic of Scale
for Demand Deposits, 28 J. FIN. 131 (1973), for several fascinating articles on the significance
of computerization to the banking industry. See also, Longbrake, Computers and the Cost
of ProducingBanking Services: Planningand Control Considerations,J. BANKING RESEARCH,
(Autumn 1973). See Breeden, Federal Regulation of Financial Services: Time for a Change,
30 FED. BAR & NEws J. 316-19 (1983) for a discussion by the Deputy Counsel to the Vice President
and Staff Director of the Administration's Task Group on the Regulation of Financial Services
[hereinafter referred to as Task Group]. The Task Group was established in 1982 by the
Administration and is comprised of Vice President Bush, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the President for Policy Development,
the Chairmen of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the FHLBB, the National Credit Union Administration Board, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
as well as the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. at 319.
Throughout this article the term "banking" is used generically to refer to the activities
of federally or state chartered commercial banks, savings and loan (or thrift) associations, mutual
savings banks and, to a lesser extent credit unions. These entities form a major subcategory
of all institutions providing financial services and are also referred to generally as "depository"
institutions. These depository institutions obtain funds from the receipt of money deposits.
They should be distinguished from non-depository institutions providing financial services such
as mutual funds, money market mutual funds, life and property insurance companies, and
pension funds. These entities gain funds from premiums, investment earnings, and other
non-deposits categories. HousE CoidM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., A REFERENCE GUIDE TO BANKING AND FINANCE 19 (Comm. Print 1981)

[hereinafter referred to as

REFERENCE GUIDE].

Commercial banks accept demand deposits, i.e., deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand, and also engage in a wide range of commercial loan activities.
See The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended [hereinafter referred to as
the BHC] 12 U.S.C. §§1841-1850; see also, a REFERENCE GUIDE, supra, at 8. Commercial banks
can be chartered by the federal government or by a state. National banks are subjected to
the initial control of the Comptroller of the Currency by the National Bank Act of 1864, ch.
106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in various sections of 12, 19 and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred
to as the National Bank Act]. See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. National
banks are also members of the Federal Reserve System [hereinafter referred to as the FRB] a national clearing system for checks and other instruments created in 1913 by the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in various sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
referred to as the Federal Reserve Act]. Deposits in national banks are also insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation [hereinafter referred to as the FCIC] a federal organization created
during the Depression and in response to the losses of depositors in uninsured banks. See the Federal
Reserve Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168 (adding section 12B to the Federal Reserve Act). Provisions pertaining to the FDIC are now codified in 12 U.S.C. §§1811-1832. As a result, national banks
are subject to the overlapping regulatory jurisdiction of at least three federal agencies, the Comptroller, the FRB, and the FDIC. See Breeden, supra, at 319; Hackley, OurBaffling Banking System
(pt. 1), 52 VA. L. REv., 565, 567 (1966). State chartered banks may belong to the FDIC as well. See
12 U.S.C. §§1814(b), 1815.
Savings and loan associations (thrifts) are also chartered either by the federal or state governments. These entities are depository institutions in that they receive deposits, but they are more
restricted in their investment activities than commercial banks, being allowed to invest generally
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ture was thought to produce, 2 however, modern market pressures have
made local control and state dominance obsolete concepts and the

system of combined federal and state regulation a burden to be avoided
at almost any cost.

As the substructure of the banking legal apparatus has undergone
fundamental change, critics of the existing framework have called for

a fundamental reform of banking controls.' Congress and regulatory
agencies have responded, but in a reactive and piecemeal fashion. Instead of directly excluding states from the area of banking regula-

tion by establishing a unified federal structure for banking regulation, Congress has retained the form of the dual system while gradually

subverting its function through passage of piecemeal legislation that
has become national in character.' The Garn-St. Germane Depository

only in home mortgages and federal government securities. Cf. infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text. The FHLBB regulates federally chartered associations. Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1421-1449. See also KEINL, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BusINESS: ITS PURPosEs, FuNCTioNs AND EcoNocaC JusTmIcAmnoN (1962); Mitchell-Lockyer, supra, at 5-12. Recently,
the functions of savings and loan associations have been dramatically expanded so that they
more resemble commercial banks. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text. Moreover the
rate differential between the amount of interest such associations can pay depositors compared
to that allowed for commercial banks is being phased out pursuant to federal legislation. See
infra notes 91, 108 and accompanying text.
Credit unions are also depository institutions. They are cooperatives in which deposits are
pooled. Membership in them is restricted so that only specified classes of persons may make
deposits. For this reason, they have not been viewed as having a significant competitive advantage over other depository institutions and the amount of interest they can pay out to their
depositors is not controlled by the federal government. The National Credit Union Administration regulates federal credit unions pursuant to the Federal Credit Union Act. 12 U.S.C.
§§1751-1795. The effect on credit unions of modem trends in banking is not the primary focus
of this article, although credit unions have benefitted from the federal authorization of special
deposit accounts designed to compete with money market funds and other aspects of deregulation. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
Commercial banks, directly, and thrift association, as an incident of their limited powers,
have been prevented from engaging in investment activities. Non-depository institutions participating in investment activities have provided intense competition for "banking" institutions.
They participate in mutual funds, bond funds, and money market funds. These entities offer
shares in pooled funds and then manage the funds by buying investment securities. They are
regulated by the securities laws (and agencies created pursuant thereto) of the state and/or

federal governments. P. RosE & D. FRASER, FINmANCIAL INsTrruTiONs 400-03 (1980).
2. See generally NORTON & Wnrruy, BANKING LAW MANuAL chs. 2 & 3 (1981); R.
TIMERLAKE, THE OIGINs or CENTRAL BANKING IN TE UNITED STATES (1978); BURNS, THE
VINEYARD oF LImERTY (1982); Englert, Bank Supervision in HistoricalPerspective, 34 Bus. LAW.
1659 (1979).
3. See Englert, supra note 2, at 1659-62; Breeden, supra note 1, at 319-22; Driskill, The
Reality of Interstate Banking, 122 TRusTs & ESTATES 12, 15 (June, 1983); La Falce, Banking
in the Eighties, 37 Bus. LAW. 839, 839 (1982). Mr. La Falce is a member of the House of
Representatives, 36th District, New York and has sponsored various pieces of legislation dealing with the banking industry. Id.
4. See Breeden, supra note 1, passim; La Falce, supra note 3, passim; Raven, Banks
Near Banks and Almost Banks-Expanding Competition Blurs TraditionalDistinctionAmong
FinancialInstitutions, 50 A.B.A. ANTrrusT L.J. 389 (1981).
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Institutions Act of 19821 is the latest, and perhaps the last, statutory
scheme designed to result in patchwork reforms of the existing system.
The Garn Act is a massive, omnibus bill primarily directed to failing thrift institutions and responsive to the clamor for deregulation
of banking functions. 6 Included within the bill is a provision preempting state policy on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage and similar real property lending instruments. 7 The Act thus curtails the freedom of states to govern certain contract and property
rights that historically have been considered within the sphere of state
power. The immediate impact of the Garn Act is softened, however,
by sections dealing with the implementation of the due-on-sale provisions. First, the statute creates a "window period" that allows contrary state due-on-sale policy to apply to loans made during a time
period prior to Gain.8 Second, the Garn Act gives the states a three
year grace period within which to reject the federal philosophy and
retain the law of the state on due-on-sale clauses for window loans. 9
The Act grants states the window and gives them a method to throw
off the federal mandate for a limited category of pre-Garn loans,
reflecting Congressional concern for the state and federal conflicts
in power that the banking system historically has generated. Less than
one year after Garn, however, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(hereinafter referred to as FHLBB) has issued regulations pursuant
to the Act that limit the ability of states to apply their own due-onsale policy even for window loans. The FHLBB may therefore oust
the states from any control over due-on-sale acceleration, even control based on fundamental equitable principles other than restraint
on alienation. '
The constitutional underpinnings of the Garn Act due-on-sale provisions also have presented interesting questions." Moreover, the
methods used in the Act to finesse the constitutional and policy considerations deserve scrutiny. 2 In California, however, consumers and
5.
6.
LAW.

7.

Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 14 (1982) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
See generally Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation Scheme, 38 Bus.

1627 (1983).

12 U.S.C. §341 (1982).

8. Id. §341(c).
9. Id.
10. 12 C.F.R. 545, 556, 590, 591. These rules/regulations were finally adopted on April
26, 1983.
11. See Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1, at 23-25 passim.
12. For instance, the federal direction that a state's policy toward "window loans" can
only be legislatively determined might conceivably raise the complex of issues suggested by
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976) and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 314 (1980) concerning the ability of the 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution
to block the exertion of federal power validly exercised pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
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realtors have been forced to give up the fight to preserve state
regulatory power and instead they have concentrated on implementing Garn in the most liberal fashion by seeking state legislation that

would broadly define the window period. Even this modest effort to
retain some state control has been rendered futile by the recent ap-

pearance of the FHLBB rules and regulations.

3

Opponents of the

FHLBB action could argue that the new regulations go far beyond

the delegation of congressional power to the agency in Garn and that these
regulations are therefore constitutionally infirm.' Nonetheless, it appears that the California proponents of restrictions on lender accelera-

tion have finally given up their long struggle and lack the will or
the capacity to fight the federal agency for the few crumbs of state

power left after the Garn Act, at least in the state legislative arena."s
The purpose of this article is to describe the recent history of the

due-on-sale controversy in California against the backdrop of evolution in the banking system. Understanding the potency of market forces
and the fundamental changes in the banking system yields a clue as
to why the state interest in local regulation of contract and property
rights emanting from loan transactions, though legitimate, ultimately
was doomed to federal domination.
A SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING REGULATION
The basic product of any financial institution is money. Various methods of regulating the "sale" of money have been used
to control and curb the power of banks. The regulations primarily have focused on four general areas: (1) the price of the product
(limits on interest rates),1" (2) the amount sold (reserve requireSee also Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1, at n. 18. The modern utility of this 10th Amendment
argument has been drastically limited by discussion like that which occurred in FederalEnergy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (1982) and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (1983).
13. See S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session (in its original form, as introduced on
February 22, 1983); see also infra notes 139-75 and accompanying text. On May 9, 1983,
approximately two weeks after the FHLBB issued its rules, S.B. 494 was gutted and transformed into a new bill dealing with the limited problem of pre-payment penalties for acceleration in the context of due-on-sales. See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
14. See generally infra note 167 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 139-75 and accompanying text.
16. Regulation of interest rates charged for the sale of money has been achieved by state
prohibitions on usury or other state legislation limiting rates in particular transactions. See
Raven, supra note 4, at 396. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art 15, §1; Retail Installment Sales Act
("Unruh Act") CAL. CIv. CODE §§1801, 1805.1; A.B. 1858, 1983-84 Regular Session. Determination of the amount of interest that lenders regulated by the FRB, and the FHLBB
can pay depositors has been effectuated by Regulation Q, C.F.R. . Rates are fixed there
on the basis of deposit maturity and size. Moreover, the dominant purpose of the scheme set
up by Regulation Q is to equalize the competitive advantages among various forms of financial
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ments), 17 (3) the methods and form of sale (restrictions on banking
functions)," and (4) the place of sale (prohibition on interstate
banking).' 9 These forms of product regulation have not been the only
institutions (e.g. banks versus thrifts). See Raven, supra note 4, at 393. See also, Banks and
Banking in the United States, 1 FED. BANKiNG L. REP. (CCH) §1001 et. seq. (1979). See First
Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969) and FirstNat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966) for a discussion of the allocation of regulatory power between the
various federal agencies (espousing the doctrine of equality in competition between depository
institutions. Most financial institutions subject to regulation are regulated by the FRB, the FDIC,
FHLBB or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation [hereinafter referred to as
the FSLIC]. See 48 Stat. 1255 (1933) (codified today in 12 U.S.C. §§1724-30f). See generally,
REFERENCE GurmE, supra note 1, at 19.

Deregulation of interest rates charged and paid out is an ongoing process. The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat
132 (1980) (codified in various parts of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the
Monetary Act of 1980] (both pre-empts state law restricting interest rates in various ways, and
provides for the orderly phase out of federal restrictions contained in Regulation Q). See,
Raven, supra note 4, at 397-98; La Falce, supra note 3, at 851-52; Norton, supra note 6,
at 1628-29; Cairns, Retail and Wholesale Banking: Diverging Markets and Lines of Commerce,
32 SYRAcusE L. REv. 713, 726-28 (1981). See generally Cox, Regulation of Interest on Deposits:
An HistoricalReview, 22 J. FiN. 274 (1967). See 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 236
for the legislative history of the Monetary Act; Weaver & O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary ControlAct of 1980: An Overview, 98 BANKING L.J. 100,
101-02 (1981).
To effectuate deregulation of rates called for in the Monetary Act, Congress established
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee [hereinafter referred to as DIDC]. See 12
U.S.C. §§3502-3503. The work of DIDC has been controversial. See, e.g., CarterAdministration Urges DIDC to Forego Adoption of Plan, American Banker, July 18, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
17. The Monetary Act of 1980 actually increased some aspects of regulation by extending
reserve requirements to all financial institutions, including non-FRB member state banks, thrifts
and credit unions. See 12 U.S.C. §461(b). This is just one example of the federalization of
banking and the continual encroachment on state power. The move was justified as "important for monetary policy" so that the power "needs to be controlled by the nation's central
bank [the FRB]." See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 236, 249, 96th Congress 2d Sess. (1980).
The Garn Act, however, liberalizes the despository restrictions relevant to all financial institutions. See Additional Views on S. 2879, S. Rep. No. 536, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 3, 1982).
18. See the Omnibus Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in various
sections of 12, 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to by its popular name "Glass-Steagall"]. GlassSteagall was passed in response to the Depression and restricted banks from investment activities. See Securities Industry Association, Public Policy Issues Raised by Bank Securities Activities, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 339, 344-52 (1983); Dunn, Expansion of NationalBank Powers:
Regulatory and JudicialPrecident Under the NationalBank Act, Glass-SteagallAct and, Bank
Holding Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J. 765, 779-80 (1982); Yesley, Defining the Product Market
in CommercialBanking, FED. REs. BANi, OF CLEv. ECON. REv. 17 (June-July 1972); La Falce,
supra note 3, at 844-48; Breeden, supra note 1, at 316; Report of the Sixty Fourth American
Assembly, Columbia University, The Future of American Financial Service Institutions (April
7-10, 1983).
Aside from prohibiting "banks" from investment activities, state and federal regulations
have historically limited the relative functions of banks and thrifts. Banks and thrifts are chartered
separately. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §1464(a)(1). In addition, banks and thrifts are regulated by
different agencies. The National Bank Act and the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§1421-1449 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter referred to as HOLA]. See generally
REFERENCE GuumE, supra note 1, at 8; Hackley, supra note 1, at 567.
Both banks and thrift associations have used the device of holding companies to avoid the
statutory restrictions on their activities and relative spheres of influence. See BHC, supra note
1, §§1841-1850. See also the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §1724, 1730(a).
19. See 12 U.S.C. §36; see also Driskell, supra note 3, at 1213.
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devices used to retard the concentration of money and power that occurs in a centralized national banking system. The checks and balances
present in the state and federal regulatory system have inhibited the
development of a truly national system for delivering financial services.2"
Currently, legislative support for an archaic system premised on local
control is rapidly diminishing.2 The shift in mood coincides with
competitive pressures in the marketplace driving financial institutions
to offer more varied services in larger geographic areas. 22 The history
of the American dualistic banking system reveals, however, that the
public perception and economic climate generating the creation of the
system have changed drastically over time.
The issue of whether the federal government should establish a national bank was one of the most controversial points of disagreement
between the Federalists and the proponents of states' rights in the
post-Revolutionary period. 23 Soon after the establishment of a national government, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton proposed the creation of a central bank for production of a national
currency and promotion of a uniform monetary policy. 24 The antiFederalists were adamantly opposed to the creation of the Bank, and
the conflict created a significant constitutional crisis during

20. See Breeden, supra note 1, at 318-19; La Falce, supra note 3, at 846-54; see also,
Scott, The Duel Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv.
1, 1-3 (1977).
21. See Breeden, supra note 1, at 319 (describing the work of the Task Force); see also,
Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the United States, Report of the President,
Department of the Treasury (1981).
22. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text. Congressman St. Germaine, Financial Institutions: A Decade of Revolution, 28 FED BAR NEW J. 97 (1981); Raven, supra note
4, at 390-91. A highly mobile citizenry and technological innovations such as electronic fund
transfers also have contributed to the explosion of the banking industry. See Consumer Credit
Protection Act, Electronic Fund Transfers, 15 U.S.C. §1693; see also Driskill, supra note 3,
at 13-15; Wall St. J., July 16, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
23. During the Revolutionary War, however, the Bank of North America was created by
the Second Continental Congress to provide general monetary aid from a central source. The
Bank later accepted a Pennsylvania charter and no longer retained the legal form necessary
to continue its national character in the post-revolutionary period. See 2 ANNALS OF CONoRESS
(Gales & Seaton eds. 1790) [hereinafter referred to as 2 Annals]; see also Englert, supra
note 2, at 1662-63; Hackley, supra note 1, at 569. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS iN A RiCA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO T=E CIn WAR 144-450 (1957); Englert, supra note 2, at 1663-64
(for a general discussion of the early controversy); Task Force Regulatory Commission, Report
Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (1949);
Via, Some Thoughts on Evaluating the TripartiteFederalBank Regulatory Scheme, 93 BANKING L.J. 509, 509-10 (1976), Hackley, Our DiscriminatingBanking Structure, 55 VA. L. REv.
1421, 1429-32 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Hackley 11].
24. See generally NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CoNsTrrnoNM. LAW 123-28 (1983)
[hereinafter referred to as NowAc]. Hamilton unveiled his position on the national bank
question in a report submitted to Congress on September 14, 1790 which is well known as
his "Report on the National Bank". See 2 ANNAs, supra note 23, at 2083-86.
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Washington's administration.2 5 The conflict was resolved when the
Federalists prevailed and established the first National Bank, 26 although
the new Bank was not successful and its charter was allowed to expire in 181 1.27 By this time, the Federalists had been ousted from
power and the subsequent administration had little interest in reviving a national bank.28
The War of 1812 quickly changed the political scene in America
and in the aftermath, the individual states were unable to promulgate
a workable monetary policy. In 1816, President James Madison,
although anti-Federalist, authorized the creation of the second National Bank.29 Soon afterwards, however, a widespread economic
depression hit the country and the Bank seemed ineffective in stopping the downward turn in the economy." More importantly, the manner in which the Bank conducted business confirmed the worst fears
of the Jeffersonians and other anti-Federalists who equated national
banking with anti-democratic concentrations of political power in the
hands of the propertied few. Branches of the Bank appeared to be
run in a corrupt manner with special privileges doled out to special
interest groups.' Many states responded with attempts to limit the
power of the Bank. 3 2 This conflict between state and federal power
over the second National Bank lead to the famous case of McCulloch
v. Maryland,33 which has primary importance today for the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the necessary and proper clause of the
Constitution."
In McCulloch, the power of the federal government to establish
a national bank was upheld in the context of a controversy concerning a Maryland tax on bank notes. 35 The decision was instrumental
in promoting an important basis for exertions of federal power, 36

25.

See NOwAK, supra note 24, at 123; TREB,

AMEiUCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §5-3 (1978).
1 Stat. 192 (1791); see also TIE, supra note 25, at §5-3.
See Englert, supra note 2, at 1664.
See NOwAK, supra note 24, at 125.
29. See DUNNE, MONETARY DEcISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 25, 27 (1960).
30. See NowAK, supra note 24, at 125.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Prior to the Civil War, federal legislation was invalidated
only in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
See also Osborn v. Bank of United States (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
34. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATEs 500 (Rev. ed. 1926);
see also, Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219
(1955) (in which Frankfurter discussed the extreme importance of McCulloch for the development of federal power).
35. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 319 (1819).
36. See Frankfurter, supra note 34, at 219.

26.
27.
28.
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however, the political climate became hostile to the Bank and the
election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency engendered a struggle
over the status of the National Bank.37 Jackson vetoed the bill to renew
the charter of the Bank and the resulting congressional conflict was
unproductive. The charter of the second National Bank expired in
1836.38 From 1836 until 1863 "free banking" prevailed in this
country.3 9 No significant federal control of banking occurred and all
who wished to embark on the business of banking could do so with
little limitation. Currency was not controlled by the federal government and private banks were allowed to issue their own notes. As
a result, a large number of different currencies were put into circulation. The problem was exacerbated by the constitutional prohibition
that precludes states from coining money and issuing bills of credit."0
Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, the banking "system" in
this country was unregulated by the federal government and remained
highly local in character. " Just as the War of 1812 created an earlier
economic necessity for the second National Bank, the Civil War provided the impetus for the seed of our current banking structure. In
1864 Congress passed the National Bank Act 42 to insure a stable source
and a uniform character of money to finance the Union war effort. 3
Congress had learned from the prior experience with the second National Bank, and this time created an apparatus that allowed private
persons to form "national banking associations" pursuant to federal
charter, subject to regulation through the office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. Moreover, sensitive to the popular suspicion of
a federal system of banking, the National Bank Act made federally
chartered banks subject to state law in a variety of ways.45 Finally,
the activities of institutions chartered pursuant to the Act were
37. See generally JAMES, TAE LaFE OF ANDREw JACKSON; Englert, supra note 2, at 1665-66.
38. See Englert, supra note 2, 1665-66; Hackley, supra note 1, at 570-71.
39. See Englert, supra note 2, at 1666; Hackley, supra note I, at 570-71.
40. See Englert, supra note 2, at 1666-67; Hackley, supra note 1, at 570-71.
41. See generally, TNERLAXE, supra note 2, at -.
42. See supra note I and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. 12 U.S.C. §21 (1976); see also 12 U.S.C. §§26-27; see'also Hackley II, supra note
23, at 1436-43. See generally Dunn, supra note 18, at 768-70; R. ROBERTSON, THE COM='mOuLR
AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAAL
(1968).
45. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §85 (subjecting nationally chartered lenders to state restrictions
on interest rates charged borrowers). But see the Monetary Act's preemption of state Monetary
Act, discussed infra note 85 and accompanying text. See also 12 U.S.C. §36 (1976) (restricts
-

national banks to state law on branching). Most importantly, contract and property rights of
persons dealing with federally chartered banks and savings and loans was thought to be a matter of state law, at least until the appearance of de la Cuesta. See Aronson v. Quick Point

Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); cf.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-83 (1973).
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restricted to the "business of banking."" The result of the National
Bank Act was to create a system of privately owned, federally chartered
banks alongside the existing state banking structure. Thus, the dualistic
character of the apparatus was formed.
conSoon after passage of the National Bank Act, litigation ensued
47 Most of
restriction.
banking
of
business
the
of
scope
cerning the
the court decisions concerned the relationship of the incidental powers
clause of the Act with this restriction.4" The incidental powers provision granted to the federally chartered banks the right to carry on
activities that were supplemental to the business of banking, when
necessary. 9 Judicial response to the clause has been characterized as
liberal.5" Through interpretation of the incidental powers clause, the
activities of national banks gradually expanded."' Again, however,
economic forces worked a change in judicial and congressional attitudes and spawned landmark legislation affecting the entire federal
and state banking structure. Both the Supreme Court and the Congress responded to the crisis of the Great Depression and the result
was a restriction on the activities of national banks and a phenomenal
increase in the amount and sources of regulation.
In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Pottorff,2 the Supreme Court
held that a proper interpretation of the incidental powers clause prohibited a bank from pledging its own assets to secure a depositor's
account, notwithstanding the convenience of the activity for the bank.
In reaching this result, the Court looked to the common practices
of most banks in addition to the risk to depositors. While the effect
of Pottorff was to narrow the scope of banking activity conducted
by federally chartered institutions, the method of analysis was similar
to that used in other cases. An important factor in the decision was
the actual activity of banks with regard to the banking function at
issue. This approach of looking at de facto patterns of business to
determine whether activities should be authorized de jure is a com-

46.

12 U.S.C. §21 (1976).

47. See generally Dunn, supra note 18, at 768-70.
48. See, e.g., First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 126-29 (1875)
(construing the "incidental powers clause"); see also, First National Bank v. City of Hartford
273 U.S. 548, 550-61 (1927) (determining the proprietary of a national bank's purchase and
sale of real estate mortgages).

49.

See Dunn, supra note 18, at 768-69.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 291 U.S. 245 (1934); see also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st
Cir. 1972).
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mon theme in banking regulation, both from a judicial and legislative
perspective."3
Modern banking regulatory agencies also were born in the
Depression.54 The Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter referred to as
FRB) had been created in 1913 to coordinate the numerous individual
banks." State banks were allowed to become members of the FRB
system, but their membership subjected them to regulation by the FRB.
In 1933 and again in 1935, the functions of the FRB were expanded
and the regulatory activities of the Board were increased. 6
Congress also responded to the crisis in the thrift industry. The
FHLBB was created and soon thereafter, the Home Owners Loan
Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to as HOLA) was enacted to establish
a federal system of savings and loan associations. The federal system
supplemented a state system of associations in poor condition due to
the rash of home foreclosures spawned by the Depression." In response
to bank failures, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as FDIC) also was established to insure depositor's funds
on account.58 State banks could become members of the FDIC system
but, once again, with membership came regulation. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FSLIC)
functioned similarly for thrifts." The effect of these new agencies
was an interconnection of the state and federal banking systems and
the subjugation of many state institutions to national regulation in
exchange for membership in federal organizations like the FRB and
the FDIC.
During the Depression, Congress also sought to limit further the
methods and forms of the "sale" of money by banks. In 1933, the
Glass-Steagall Act was passed, plugging a particularly attractive
loophole by restricting banks from participating in investment
activities.6" Banks already had been prohibited from many other func-

53. See Dunn, supra note 18 at 768-70.
54. See generally de la Cuesta 102 S. Ct. at 3025; Laurens Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 365 U.S. 517, 521-22 (1980); Englert, supra note
2, at 1671-72; Breeden, supra note 1, at 316-18.
55. See The Federal Reserve Act, supra note 1, §§221-522; see also Breeden, supra note
1, at 316-17; Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works - Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 11 How. L.J. 71, 71-77 (1965).
56. See Hackely II, supra note 23, at 1422.
57. See de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. at 3025-29; Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1, at 6-7.

58. 48 Stat. 168 (1933).
59.
60.

FSLIC, supra note 1. See generally Hackley, supra note 1, at 577-78.
See generally the Glass-Steagall Act, supra note 18; White Paper, supra note 18, at
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tions by judicial construction of the "business of banking" limitation in the Banking Act. 6' Like banks, federal thrift associations also
were limited in their activities because the primary function of the
associations was viewed as providing loan funds to finance the purchase of real property. 62 Finally, the National Bank Act already had
subjected national banks to the branching restrictions of the state in
which the bank was located, inhibiting interstate banking as a result.63
By the end of the 1930's, the banking "system" in this country,
consequently, was characterized by a federal and state structure of
institutions, subject to differing sources of primary regulation, but
interlocked to some extent by regulatory overlap." In addition, two
major types of institutions were allowed in both the state and federal
arenas-"banks" and "thrifts"-each with restricted functions and
separate spheres of operation in the financial market. The local
character of the whole system was preserved, first by the dualistic
nature, then by geographic restrictions, and finally by subjecting
federally chartered entities to state law on some subjects." At the
time, this complex and interwoven pattern seemed to serve the needs
of a populace that was not particularly mobile and an economy that
was recovering from the Depression.
Economic boom and the vast demographic upheaval that the Second World War wrought, made great changes in the financial
marketplace but the system was very slow to respond. The post-War
world signalled the appearance of factors that today make the
establishment of a truly national system of banking inevitable. After
the Second World War, the non-bank financial intermediaries began
to compete successfully with banks and other institutions for the
available money supply.6 6 The banking community fought back by
aggressively attempting to re-establish a broad interpretation of the
344-47; Farrar, Commercial Banks, Trust Departments, and Concentration of Power; A Legacy
of Glass-Steagall, 4 J. Comp. CoRP. L. & SEc. REG. 237, 237-38 (1982).
61. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 768-70; see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §36.
63. See Hackley, supra note 1, at 565-78; Breeden, supra note 1, at 316-17; Raven, supra
note 4, at 392.
64. Breeden, supra note 1, at 316-17.
65. Mortgage and property rights have been generally deemed to be within the power of
the states. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Moreover, some courts
have treated thrift associations as being subject to state law in the conduct of their external
affairs. See Holiday Shores No. 3 v. Midwestern Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., 308 N.W.2d
471, 478 (Minn. 1981); Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. of Jefferson Parish v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 651 F.2d 259, 266 (5th Cir. 1981). The de la Cuesta decision provided a striking blow to historic state prerogatives in these areas. See generally Mitchell-Lockyer,
supra note 1.
66. See generally Hackley, supra note 1, at 771-82; Dunn, supra note 18, at 770.

1984/Due-On-Sales
incidental powers clause of the National Bank Act. 67 In a series of

clashes with various interest groups, banks sought to sell insurance, 8
to conduct travel agency businesses, 69 to act as couriers, 7 and to pro-

vide non-bank data processing services to the general public. 7 I With

72
the exception of the right to engage in personal property leasing,

the Supreme Court and various federal appellate courts generally invalidated Comptroller rulings allowing these expanded activities.73
After the war, banks and savings and loan associations each began
to look at the activities of the other to find ways to perform prohibited functions. 74 Banks were particularly attracted to the range of

real property activities undertaken and to the tax advantages enjoyed
67. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 770-76; Robertson, supra note 44, at 158.
68. See Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc., 268 F. Supp.
236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). Section 92 of the National Bank
Act provides an express authorization that a national commercial bank may write insurance
where located and doing business in any place with five thousand inhabitants or less. See 12
U.S.C. §92. Nonetheless, the Comptroller's Ruling No. 7110 provided that banks could
act as insurance agents for the issurance of insurance "incident to banking transactions". The
suing Georgia insurance agents argued that since the National Banking act did not speak of
insurance writing in population centers with more than five thousand persons, the ability of
banks to engage in such conduct was impliedly prohibited by the Act. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. at 236.
69. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 779 (D. Mass. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d
1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 315, aff'd on remand, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970),
rev'd and remanded, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d
427 (1st Cir. 1972). As the up and down history of the decision may suggest Arnold Tours
was a test case in which a direct construction of the incidental powers clause was available.
See Dunn, supra note 18, at 770 n.78.
70. Courier services were important in the struggle between banks and thrifts for a market
share because they became involved in the issue of de facto branching. By maintaining deposit
receptacles in shopping centers and'then transporting money dropped by their own couriers,
banks could effectively get around state restrictions on branching to which they were subject.
See First National Bank v. Dickinson, 400 F.2d 548, 550-52 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 396 U.S.
122 (1969).
71. The significance of this service became increasingly important in the computer data
processing era that began in earnest in the late sixties and continues to this day. See National
Retailers Corp. v. Valley National Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff'd, 604 F.2d
32 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. See M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); see also the Comptroller ruling at issue, codified at 12 C.F.R.
§7.3400 (1976); cf. 12 C.F.R. §7.7376 (1976).
73. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 767-70 (excellent general discussion of this era and a
comparison of the cases it spawned with cases appearing soon after the passage of the National
Bank Act).
74. See American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 595 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 920 (1979) (invalidating regulations allowing various new transactions for thrifts and
credit unions). But cf. The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in various sections of 12, 15, and
42 U.S.C.) (where some important new powers were granted thrifts)). See generally Calms,
supra note 16, at 724-26; Norton, supra note 6, at 1646 n.138; Hayes Retail Banking in an
Interest Sensitive World, 163 BANKERS MAO. (July-Aug. 1980); HousE COMM. ON BANKING, FNANcE AND URBAN AsiAIIns, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., SURVEY OF BRANCBING POWERS,
AND TRUST AND INvar.SNT POWERS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COMMERCIAL BANKS, SAVINGS
AN LOAN AssocrATioNs, CREDIT UNIONS AND MuTuAL SAvINGs BANKS (Comm. print 1978)
[hereinafter referred to as House SURvEy OF POWERS].
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by thrift associations pursuant to state and federal law." Both banks
and thrift associations were motivated to strike out and find new
market sources in response to the intense competition from non-bank
financial intermediaries. Holding companies seemed to provide the
answer.76 In 1956, however, the Bank Holding Company Act
(hereinafter referred to as BHC) was enacted and regulation of holding
company activities began." The BHC applied only to holding companies owning more than a single bank, so that "one-bank" companies were not regulated.7" In the 1960's, when the courts were narrowly construing the "incidental powers clause," many banks resorted
to one-bank holding companies to subvert the restrictions of the National Bank Act and the BHC.79 The BHC was amended in 1970,
however, to cover one-bank companies as well. Savings and loans
also were restricted by the thrift association analog to the BHC,80
the Savings and Loan Association Holding Company Act. 8
The late 1960's and early 1970's also signalled a push by depository
institutions to avoid geographic restrictions on branching, particularly
interstate branching. Electronic fund transfer and Automated Teller
Service, as well as the growth of metropolitan areas lapping over state
lines, have added to the extreme pressures to remove restrictions on
82
interstate activity.
CURRENT TRENDS IN BANKING

"Banking in the Eighties"'" is characterized by a deregulation of
interest rates, an increasing similarity between banks and thrift associations, extended functions for almost all regulated "banking" institutions, intense competition from non-bank intermediaries, and de facto
interstate banking." ' Notwithstanding the local character of the banking
system's legal structure, economic and demographic forces have made
niG

75. See generally Jones, Bank and Thrift Affiliations: The Current Opportunities, 100 BANKL.J. 247, 247-48 (1983).

76. See generally Dunn, supra note 18, at 784-92; Jones, supra note 75, at 254-56.
77. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
78.

Id.

79. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 785; STAFF REPORT

OF Tnm SuBcoMM. ON DomEsnc Fn'ANCE,
HOUSE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1sT SEss., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
REFORM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Comm. Print 1973).

80. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760
(amending 12 U.S.C. §§1841-1849).

81.

The SHLC is more limited, however, than the BHC is in some respects. See 12 U.S.C.

§1730(a). See also Jones, supra note 75, at 252-54.
82. See generally, Driskill, supra note 3, at 12-13.
83. The phrase was coined by U.S. Representative La Falce. See La Falce, supra note

3, at 839.
84. See generally id. at 839; Driskill, supra note 3, at 313-15; Breeden, supra note 1, at
316-19.
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the states increasingly powerless to enforce their own policies from
a practical perspective. Congress implicitly has recognized the impact
of these de facto patterns of banking activity and has responded with
national legislation that has caused even more federal encroachment
on state prerogatives.
In response to the effect of inflation on the health of depository
institutions, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as
the Monetary Act).8" The Monetary Act has the following two primary
functions: authorization of new activities for thrift associations that
allow the associations to undertake functions similar to those of commercial banks"6 and pre-emption of state limitations on the rate of
interest that borrowers could charge for certain kinds of loans.87 Both
features were designed to make depository institutions more competitive, especially with regard to money market funds. The Monetary
Act also established the Despository Institutions Deregulation Committee (hereinafter referred to as DIDC) 88 and charged the committee
with the responsibility of issuing regulations and guidelines to ease
the process of deregulation. 9 Some of the power of the FRB also
was delegated to the DIDC.
The thrift industry provided much of the impetus for passage of
the Monetary Act, arguing that the impact of inflation on the intermediation of loan funds put thrift associations in a precarious
condition.90 Savings and loan associations asserted that the differential between the interest rate that they were required to pay to attract
depositors and the rate of return on long term real estate loans was
destructive of the fundamental financial health of thrift associations,
making the associations as vulnerable as they had been during the
Depression. 9' State restrictions on lender use of due-on-sale provi92
sions were claimed to exacerbate this effect.
Both savings and loan associations and commercial banks were
particularly interested in the freedom from restrictions on interest rates
provided by the Monetary Act. The banking industry continued to
push for more federal legislation designed to deregulate interest rates
85. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See generally Norton, supra note 6, at 1630;
1980 U.S. CODE CoNG & AD. NEws 236 (for the legislative history of the act); Weaver &
O'Malley, supra note 16, at 102-06.
86. See generally Raven, supra note 4, at 397-400; Norton, supra note 6, at 1628-29.
87. See Raven, supra note 4, at 397-400; Norton, supra note 6, at 1628-29.
88. See DIDC, supra note 16, §§3502-3503.
89. Id.
90. See generally La Falce, supra note 3, at 845-46, 851-52.
91. See de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3030.
92. Id.
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further, expand banking functions, and increase the power of regulatory agencies to respond to bank and savings and loan failures.
The result was passage of the Garn Act in 1982. 91 Garn goes a long
way toward accomplishing the objectives of deregulating rates and
functions, yet the Act does not answer key questions concerning interstate branching nor reach the more fundamental issue of whether
a unitary federal system should be initiated at this time.94

THE GARN AcT-A BAsic OUTLIN
The final version of Garn comprises seven acts in seven titles, 95
each affecting different aspects of the banking industry. This article
will briefly outline the more important aspects of the Act.
The Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act (Title 1)96 expands the authority
of various federal agencies providing insurance on depositor accounts
to give assistance to troubled institutions. 97 This part of Gain enlarges
the types of financial assistance doled out by these agencies and
authorizes merger and acquisition of distressed institutions. In this
regard, Garn appears to approve recent FRB orders that allow affiliation of thrift institutions and banks as one solution to the problem of a financially impaired institution."8 One of these orders was
issued prior to final passage of Garn, and concerned the acquisition
of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association by Citicorp. 99 Fidelity
had been placed in receivership by the FSLIC. Citicorp, a bank holding
company, was willing to offer more financial assistance to Fidelity
than any other bidder, thus garnering the acquisition. This was the
first instance in which the FSLIC as well as the FRB acted on an
application that had the practical effect of joining the functions of
a savings and loan association with a commercial bank. 10 0 Aside from
fulfilling the immediate objective of providing assistance to troubled
institutions, the Act significantly reduces historical restrictions on banking functions, interest rates, and even reserve requirements.' 0
Title III of Gan is denoted as "Thrift Institutions Restructuring
Act."'0 z An innovative feature of the title is the direction to the DIDC
93. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 14 (1982) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C);
see also La Falce, supra note 3, at 842-43; Norton, supra note 6, at 1633-35.
94. See Hackley II, supra note 23, 1432-34.
95. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 14 (1982) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
96. Id.; 12 U.S.C. §§101-142.

97.

12 U.S.C. §101-102; see also Norton, supra note 6, at 1630-31.

98.

See Jones, supra note 74, at 1264-68.

99. Id.at 262-64.
100. Id.
101.

See generally Norton, supra note 6, at 1627-28.

102.

See the Garn Act, 12 U.S.C. §§301-355.
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to create an account competing with money market funds.' 3 The DIDC
immediately responded with the NOW account, and in December 1982
went on to authorize the "Super-NOW," an entity that resembles
a money market account but has the feature of unlimited transactions."4
The Garn Act relaxed the lending limitations placed on commercial banks in a variety of ways."0 5 Moreover, Gain amended the Federal
Reserve Act to define the specific relationship between bank affiliates.10 6 Commercial banks lost a significant fight when the form of
the Garn Act that was passed included prohibitions on the insurance
activities of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.0 7 Nonetheless, the benefits that Garn gives to the banking community outweigh
the detriments, particluarly because the Garn Act contains a provision requiring DIDC to eliminate interest rate differentials between
banks and thrift associations by January 1, 1984.108
The combined effect of both the Monetary Act of 1980 and the
Garn Act of 1982 has been generally to extend the approved functions of depository institutions (particularly thrift associations)," 9 to
deregulate interest rates," 0I and to provide needed short term help for
troubled institutions."' To accomplish these results, some of the most
fundamental features of the dual banking system have been significantly
eroded. The Garn Act went further than continuing the momentum
generated by the Monetary Act to change the structure of banking
in America: the Act responded to the due-on-sale clause controversy
by pre-empting state law that regulated the clauses and by applying
the federal law to state depository institutions as well as to institutions subject to federal regulation." 2 The due-on-sale controversy set103.

Id. §327.

104.

See 47 Fed. Reg. 56, 320 (Dec. 16, 1982). Norton believes that the Investment Com-

pany Institute will begin a court challenge to the new instruments. Norton, supra note 6, at

1634 n.51. The term "NOW" account refers to an account which generates instruments known
as negotiable orders of withdrawal. A negotiable order of withdrawal allows the withdrawal

of funds from a savings or similar interest bearing account. See BRADY, ON CHECKS (4th ed.
Bailey) §1.17 & n.l. These instruments physically resemble and function similarly to regular
checks. They contain blank spaces for the indication of the payee and the signature of the
withdrawing depositor and are third party instruments. Id. Such instruments differ from checks,
however, in that they are payable through a named bank were the savings and loan institution
has its own commercial account. Id. Unresolved questions exist concerning whether NOW instruments are truly negotiable and whether they are checks in fact. Id.
105. See Norton, supra note 6, at 1635-37.
106. See the Garn Act, 12 U.S.C. §410 (amending the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §371c).
107. Id. §§426-427.
108. Id. §326.
109. See Norton, supra note 6, at 1627-28.
110. Id.
Ill. Id; see also La Falce, supra note 3, at 839-43.
112. See the Garn Act, 12 U.S.C. §341.
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tied by Garn had been brewing since individual states began to restrict
lender exercise of loan acceleration provisions for economic reasons.",
TBE DuE-ON-SALE CONTROVERSY

California limits lender use of due-on-sale' 4 provisions through the
landmark case of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America."' Wellenkamp
was the logical result of a line of precursive decisions gradually narrowing the circumstances within which a lender could resort to the
due-on-sale clause in a lending instrument as a device to retire long
term loans made at an unprofitable rate or to force an increase in
interest rates." 6 In that case, the California Supreme Court held that
the lender must demonstrate that the transfer of property will impair its
security before the provision can be activated.'

For the court, "im-

pairment of security" could normally be demonstrated only by proof
of a transfer likely to increase the risk of physical wastage to the
property or actual depreciation in its fair market value." ' The practical result of Wellenkamp was to curtail the increasing practice of
lenders to use the due-on-sale provision to eliminate old loans made
at low rates. A number of other states follow a similar policy, either
by legislative enactment or judicial decision."19
Thrift associations were more adversely affected by state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses than were commercial banks.' 0 Banks,
at least until recently, had a broader range of banking functions and
113.

See, e.g., de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. at _

; Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1, at 20-22;

cf Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
114. The due-on-sale clause is a provision allowing acceleration of the outstanding balance
due on a loan on transfer of the real property or a related transaction. The Garn -Act defines
the clause as:
[A] contract provision which authorizes a lender, at its option, to declare due
and payable sums secured by the lender's instrument if all or any part of the prop-

erty, or an interest therein, securing the real property loan is sold or transferred
without the lender's prior written consent ...
12 U.S.C. §341(a)(1).
115. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
116. See generally Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 312, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964) (concluded restraint was reasonable); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5
Cal. 3d '864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (precluded enforcement unless the lender
could show that enforcement was reasonably necessary to protect its security); Tucker v. Lassen
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1974) (required a
significant showing that enforcement was necessary); see also Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1,
at I n.1, 2.
117. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 943-53, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 384-85 (1978).
118. Id.
119. See Mitchell-Lockyer, supra note 1, at 3 n.10.
120. Id. at 14-20.
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were therefore less sensitive to the impact of inflation on the housing
market. As a result, the federal agency responsible for thrift associations responded aggressively to protect federal savings and loans at
the expense of conflicting state policy.
In 1976, the FHLBB issued regulations authorizing federal thrift
associations to include due-on-sale provisions in their lending agreements. 2 1 The regulation was permissive by its literal terms although
the preamble declared that the intent of the FHLBB is creating the
122
rule was to pre-empt conflicting state law affecting federal entities.'
The FHLBB regulations inevitably clashed with state policy in jurisdictions like California where due-on-sale restrictions continued to 1be
23
developed and were applied to loans made by federal institutions.
The power of the regulation to pre-empt state law, at least with regard
to federal lenders, was decided by the United States Supreme Court
in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Reginald de la
Cuesta.124 In that case, the Court held that the FHLBB regulation
expressed what had always been implicit in the very structure of the
federal system of savings and loan associations: the FHLBB was
delegated broad power to effectuate HOLA and valid regulations which
force when they conflicted
served that purpose
125 so carried pre-emptive
with state law.
De la Cuesta provided the constitutional underpinning for the pending Garn Act, and a little more than six months after the decision
appeared, the Act was passed by Congress. Garn goes far beyond the
factual context of de la Cuesta, however, because the Act pre-empts
state policy on due-on-sales for lenders with no federal aspect. Section 341 of the Act provides:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of the constitution or laws (including the judicial decisions) of any state to the contrary, a lender
may, subject to subsection (c), enter into or enforce a contract con-2
taining a due-on-sale clause with respect to a real property loan.' 1
Subdivision (c) of section 341 goes on to establish a window period
for pre-Garn loans. For a limited category of loans made before
the Act was passed, the window period delays the pre-emptive effect
of the due-on-sale provisions until three years after the date of their
121. The regulation originally appeared in 12 C.F.R. §546.6-11(f). See 44 Fed. Reg. 39, 108,
39, 149 ,(1976).
122. Id.

123. See, e.g., Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 979, 180
Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982); see also de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. at 3023-24.
124. See de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. at 3025.
125. The Gain Act, 12 U.S.C. §341(b)(1).

126. Id. §341(c)(1).
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' For window loans, only transfer acenactment (October 15, 1982). 27
tivity occurring after the three year period will be regulated by federal
law. Moreover, Garn allows the state legislature to act within the three
year period to "otherwise regulate" contracts made by state lenders,
so that the states may legislatively throw off the federal mandate.' 28
Notwithstanding the federal pre-emptive scheme in Garn, the Act
contains some significant restrictions on the lender's right to enforce
the due-on-sale clauses. In the following types of transactions, the
lender is prohibited from resorting to the provision: (1) creation of
subordinate liens or encumbrances that do not relate to the transfer
of a right of occupancy, (2) creation of purchase money security interests for household appliances, (3) certain transfers occurring on
the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety, (4) transfer to
a relative on death of the borrower, (5) granting of a leasehold of
three years or less without an option to purchase, (6) transfers to
a spouse or children of the borrower, (7) transfers related to dissolution or divorce, and (8) transfers pursuant to inter vivos trusts under
certain restrictions.' 2 9 The provisions of Garn outlined above are deceptively simple. The short history of the due-on-sale controversy since
the passage of the Act has demonstrated that there is a latent ambiguity in many of the provisions. 3 ' This ambiguity has become important as the states have struggled to implement Garn in the most
painless fashion possible, with an aggressive federal agency, the
FHLBB, snapping at their heels.
127. The Gain Act provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a contract involving a real property loan which was made or assumed
.. . during the period beginning on the date a State adopted a constitutional provision or statute prohibiting the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, or the date on which
the highest court of such State has rendered a decision (or, if the highest court has
not so decided, the date on which the next highest appellate court has rendered a
decision. . . .) prohibiting such exercise, and ending on the date of enactment of
this section, the provision of subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of a transfer
which occurs on or after the expiration of 3 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act, except that(A) a State, by a State law enacted by the State legislature prior to the close of
such 3-year period, with respect to real property loans originated in the state by lenders
other than by national banks, Federal savings and loan associates, Federal savings
banks, and Federal credit unions, may otherwise regulate such contracts, in which
case subsection (b) shall apply only if such State law provides ...
12 U.S.C. §341(c)(1).
128. Id. §341(c)(I)(A).
129. Id.
130. See Preamble to S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session; California Realtors Association,
Comments on Proposed Rule, Preemption of State Due-On-Sales Law (a position paper submitted to the FHLBB on March 17, 1983) [hereinafter referred to as Comments] (copy on
file at the Pacific Law Journal). Compare id. with 12 U.S.C. §341(c)(1)(A) (for the interpretative issues raised concerning whether a loan that originated both prior to a state restriction on due-on-sales and prior to Garn, is entitled to any protection).
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Issues that have sparked debate include the definition of the beginning point of the window period,"' the unrestricted right of states
to interpret the Garn definition,' 32 and the status of pre-Garn loans
that are also pre-window.' 33 Moreover, application of the Garn
exceptions themselves has proved to be a great source of controversy.
The most disputed issue seems to be whether commercial borrowers
will be entitled to the benefit of the exceptions. 3 4 Additionally, Garn
left open the question of whether lenders may extract pre-payment
penalties when accelerating loans through due-on-sales.' 3 Perhaps most
importantly, the right of states to regulate lender behavior in the dueon-sale acceleration process in any manner now is open to doubt.' 36
By its terms, Garn delegated to the IFHLBB the right and responsibility to promulgate rules, regulations, and interpretative guidelines
to effectuate the due-on-sale provisions of the Act.' 37 The FHLBB
issued its first regulation set in response on April 26, 1983. ' 31 The
regulations have proved controversial and their impact on pending
legislation in California has been dramatic.
SENATE BILL

494

During the same period when the FHLBB was considering the substance of rules and regulations to be issued pursuant to the Garn
Act, legislation was introduced in California that focused on many of
the ambiguities in the due-on-sale provision of the Act. In February of
1983, California State Senator Barry Keene introduced Senate Bill 494, a
measure sponsored by the California Realtors Association (hereinafter
referred to as the Realtors) to make California law "consistent" with
Garn. 39 Senate Bill 494 (hereinafter referred to as S.B. 494) was
designed to accomplish several goals. First, the bill was to define the
window period for California with more specificity, making the period
coincide with the rendition of the Wellenkamp decision. 41 Second,
the bill purported to prohibit automatic acceleration for loans in a
131. See Supplementary Information 4-8, 9-10 to FHLBB final rules, Preemption of State
Due-On-Sales Law, 12 C.F.R. Parts 545, 556, 590, and 591, 48 Fed. Reg. No. 100 (Part II)
(1983) [hereinafter referred to as, Supplementary Information]; see also 12 C.F.R. §591.2(p).
132. See Comments, supra note 130, at 8-11; see also Supplementary Information, supra
note 131, at 5.
133. See Comments, supra note 130, at 12-13.
134. Id. at 2-8.
135. The Garn Act is silent on the question. See 12 U.S.C. §341.
136. See 12 C.F.R. §591.5; see also Comments, supra note 130, at 14-15.
137. 12 U.S.C. §341(3)(1).
138. 48 Fed. Reg. no. 100, (Part I) (1983).

139.

S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session.

140.

Id.
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transaction "by which the property is sold or transferred" if the transaction occurred before October 15, 1982.1"' The effect of this provision
seems to be to inhibit acceleration of all pre-Garn loans, not just
window loans.
S.B. 494 would have effectuated these changes by adding a new
section'711.1 to the California Civil Code.' In Wellenkamp, the
California Supreme Court had construed section 711 to limit lender
exercise of the due-on-sale clause.' 3 Moreover, the bill would have
amended section 2924.6 of the California Civil Code specifically to
engraft the Garn exception into California law. 44 In the statement
of purpose and findings supporting the legislation, proposed S.B. 494
asserted that the application of the Garn Act was ambiguous and that
the states needed to enact particular legislation to remove those
ambiguities.' 5 The bill declared that the state of California would
be acting positively on provisions contained in the Garn Act and that
the legislature would be ".

.

. acting within the express and implied

authority delegated to the states by the Garn Act and pursuant to
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.... ,46

Even the limited territory staked out by S.B. 494 in its original
version could not survive the regulations promulgated by the FHLBB.
On May 9, 1983, only a few weeks after the appearance of the regulations, the bill was amended and reformulated into a simple provision prohibiting pre-payment penalties extracted by lenders in the
context of due-on-sale.' 4 7 The FHLBB regulations impliedly conflict
with S.B. 494 as it was originally introduced in a number of ways.
Moreover, when compared to the delegation of Congressional power
effectuated by Garn, the regulations very well may exceed the limits
of that power.
At the same time, that the Realtors were seeking passage of S.B.
494 in the state legislative arena, they also were fighting specific provisions of the rules proposed by the FHLBB to effectuate the due-on-sale
provisions of the Garn Act. A dqcument entitled, "Comments on
Proposed Rule, Pre-emption of State Due-on-Sale Laws"'148 (hereinafter
referred to as Comments) filed by the Realtors in conjunction with

141.
142.

Id.
Id. (and the preamble thereto).

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session.
Id.
Id.
Id. (in its form as amended in the Senate on May 9, 1983).

148.

See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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testimony presented in public hearings on the proposed rules contain
the objections to specific provisions. 4 9 As part of the "Supplementary Information"15 0 accompanying the proposed rule, the FHLBB
reserved the right to issue interpretations defining the window period
in the various states. 1 ' The Realtors objected, asserting that the
legislative history of Garn indicated a congressional intent to give that
right to the states.' 52 The Comments also questioned the FHLBB position that state override of Gan on loans during window periods could
not be accomplished by initiative or referendum.' 5 3 Finally, the FHLBB
regulations apparently restrict the protections of pre-Garn loans from
lender accelerations to window period loans as well. 54 Thus, the
FHLBB rules resolve that ambiguity in the statute in favor of the
lender.
The FHLBB interpretation of the meaning of requiring transferees
on protected loans to meet "customary credit standards" was also
a point of controversy. 155 The Board inserted a requirement that the
customary credit standards must be determined by the "lender.' 56
The Realtors objected, arguing in the Comments that this language
could destroy any protections against lender acceleration.1 57
The major point of controversy became the meaning of the Garn
exceptions to due-on-sale acceleration for certain types of transactions and the power of states to tailor those exceptions. 5 ' First, the
FHLBB rule had the effect of prohibiting commercial lenders from
taking advantage of the Garn exceptions for specific types of transactions by restricting the exceptions to loans that are "on the security
of a home occupied or to be occupied by borrower." '1 9 In the Comments, the Realtors argued that the variation among states as to
whether commercial lenders should be protected by restrictions on
due-on-sales should not be disturbed by Garn.1 60 Because the case
149. Id. In the Comments, the Realtors objected to a variety of aspects of the proposed
FHLBB rules including (1) the status of commercial borrowers, (2) issues relating to the "window period", (3) the meaning and application of the customary credit" requirement for window loans, and (4) the extent of state power to regulate the manner of lender acceleration
in the context of due-on-sales. Comments, supra note 130, 2-8, 10-15.
150. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
151. Comments, supra note 130, at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id.at 9.
154. Id.at 12-13.
155. Id. at 10-12; see also 12 U.S.C. §341(c)(2)(A).
156. See Supplementary Information, supra note 131, at 13-14.
157. See Comments, supra note 130, at 10-12.
158. See id. at 2-7.
159. 12 C.F.R. §591.5(b); see also §291.5(b)(1)(i)-(vi); Comments, supra note 130, at 6-7.
160. Comments, supra note 130, at 4.
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of Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Court extended the Wellenkamp
rationale to commercial loans and even to private lenders in
California,161 the Realtors argued that the Garn exceptions should apply
to non-consumer borrowers. 6" Perhaps the most important objection
for the long term made in the Comments dealt with the power of
the states, after Garn, to regulate in any manner lender conduct in
the context of due-on-sale clauses. The FHLBB rules provide that:
• . . the practices of Federal associations and other lenders shall

be governed exclusively by the Board's Regulations, in pre-emption
of and without regard to any limitations imposed by states on either
their inclusion or exercise, including without limitation, state law
prohibitions against restraints on alienation, prohibitions against
forfeitures, equitable restrictions, and state law dealing with equitable
63
transfer.
The apparent ouster of the states from the whole area of due-onsale clause acceleration raises a number of important questions. For
example, may a state court entertain arguments of a borrower that
a particular lender is estopped from relying on an acceleration provision due to the facts of the particular transaction? Would the doctrine of unconscionability be available in an individual case? Could
the courts of California extend the theory of "reasonable expectations" to an adhesion contract providing for an obligation due-onsale? The FHLBB rule is unclear on whether the prohibition against
equitable principles applies only to the sort that are used to create
substantive rights for broad classes of persons and are applied to all
lenders across the board (as in Wellenkamp), or whether the ability
to give equitable relief in an individual case on particular facts is
impaired.
A potential conflict exists between the right of states to legislate
in the area of home foreclosures and the power of the agency to regulate
foreclosures. The Realtors have pointed out that California Civil Code
section 2924.5 currently provides that a condition to enforceability
of a due-on-sale clause is that it appear in both the note and security agreement of the transaction. "' Has this requirement been impliedly pre-empted by the agency regulation? If not, how far could
a state go in regulating the form of a contract containing an accelera161. Dawn Investment Co., 30 Cal. 3d at 702-04, 639 P.2d at 978-79, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 335-37.
162. Comments, supra note 130, at 4.
163. 12 C.F.R. §§591.4(b), 591.5. The exception stated in section 591.5, deals with the
operation of the window period for loans originated by other federal associations. See 12 C.F.R.
§591(4)(b).
164. CAL. Civ. CODE §2924.5.
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tion for transfer provision or impose other time, place, and manner
restrictions on resort to the clause?
Comments in the Senate Report to Garn indicate that the intent
was to leave "state laws with respect to property rights, state securities
laws or state foreclosure laws" intact.' 6 The bold assertion of dominance by the FHLBB in the whole area will be the source of litigation
as states legislatively or judicially attempt to test the meaning and
boundaries of the agency rule.
S.B. 494, in original form, might have provided the impetus for
testing the boundaries of the Garn Act. The bill was conceived to
follow through with Garn and to make interaction between federal
law and remaining state authority clear and smooth. 6 6 Because the
original bill purported only to do what the Garn Act explicitly or
impliedly authorized, S.B. 494 could have been used to force a determination of the relation of the FHLBB rules to the actual delegation
of congressional power. 67 This was not to be. With the appearance
of the FHLBB's regulations, the Realtors turned their focus away
from the main points of the Garn pre-emptive provisions and concentrated on the one area that the federal regulations did leave to
state control-the issue of pre-payment penalties on acceleration via
the due-on-sale clause.
Proposed FHLBB rule section 591.5(b)(2) would have imposed a
federal prohibition on lender charges for pre-payment penalties when
used in conjunction with the due-on-sale provision. 68 The ban did
not end up in the final form of the rules except in a limited sense
for a certain class of loans made after 1976 and before the final promulgation of the regulations. 69 Instead, the FHLBB determined that
the matter of pre-payment on acceleration in the context of due-onsales should be left to the states. 7
On May 9, 1983, S.B. 494 was amended and transformed from
a bill designed to implement Garn in California to a bill directed to
the issue of pre-payment. "' The amended form of the bill purported
165. Senate Report page 25.
166. S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session.
167. Agency regulations only have preemptive force if they are validly made and coincide
with the grant of Congressional authority. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82
(1961). But, where the exertion of agency power is rationally related to the Congressional grant
or scheme, the agency will not have exceeded its authority. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,
668 (1962). See generally de la Cuesta, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022-23 (1982).
168. Supplementary Information, supra note 131, at 16-17; see also, Comments, supra note
130, at 15-16
169. See, Supplementary Information, supra note 131, at 16-17.
170. Id.
171. S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session.
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to add new section 2954.10 to the California Civil Code and provided
for a blanket prohibition on acceleration without regard to the nature
of the underlying transaction or the status of the borrower:
2954.10. An obligee which accelerates the maturity date of the principal and accrued interest, pursuant to contract on any loan secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property, upon the conveyance
of any right, title, or interest in that property, may not claim, exact, or collect any charge, 172fee, or penalty for any pre-payment
resulting from acceleration.
Even this version was opposed by aspects of the banking industry
73
in California who wanted to limit the scope of the bill even further.
Accordingly, the bill was amended again and the final version reflects
a "settlement agreement" between the California League of Savings
174
Institutions, the California Bankers Association, and the Realtors.
S.B. 494, as finally passed by the California Legislature, prohibits
lenders from insisting on pre-payment penalties when they have accelerated the borrower's obligation by use of the due-on-sale provisions, but commercial borrowers may waive or agree to forego the
17
protection of the prohibition on certain conditions. 1
CONCLUSION

Today, the position of the Realtors in regard to the issue of dueon-sales is dramatically different than it was even two or three years
ago when the Wellenkamp decision had given the Realtors a practical
advantage in the legislative arena. The purpose of this article is to
describe the shift in power as exemplified by the history and the events
surrounding passage of SB. 494 and to illustrate the capacity of the
market forces in the banking industry to sweep aside legitimate state
concerns, even in areas traditionally reserved to the states. The whole
saga of the due-on-sale controversy, from the state judicial and
legislative expressions creating the conflict through de la Cuesta to
Garn and now their aftermath is just one harbinger of the federal
unitary system of banking that may be established in the next decade,
if not sooner.
De facto patterns in the banking industry have always been critically
important to the creation and interpretation of the legal basis of its
172. Id.
173. California Bankers Association, statement of Opposition to S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular
Session (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (as amended) 1-2.

174.

Information provided by Senator Barry Keene's office, September 10, 1983 reflected

in the bill file to S.B. 494.

175.

S.B. 494, 1983-84 Regular Session (in its final form as passed on September 13, 1983).
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structure. From the time of the Revolution when the existence of the
National bank depended on the vagaries of politics and foreign policy,
through the Civil War, when the apparatus of the current system was
born, through the Depression and now the technological revolution,
actual patterns in the delivery of financial services as determined by
economic, demographic, and political forces have always affected the
form of the banking system de jure. Perhaps the response to consumers and realtors in California can best be understood by an analogy
to the proverbial salmon swimming upstream. At this point, and for
the foreseeable future at least, the river is in a flood stage about to
overflow its banks. The power of an individual state or interest group
depending on state control to swim upstream against the current is
limited, if not non-existent.
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